Abstract: We characterize, by the one-shot game terms, the set of lower equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted repeated game with non-observable actions.
Introduction
The classical theory of repeated games deals with standard information, i.e., after each stage of the game the players get information about the actions (of each one of the players) that took place in that stage.
[L1 ] deals with the case in which each player is informed of the equivalence class of the action of each of the other players in the previous stage. Here we refer to the general case in which the actions are non-observable and the information the players get is a function of the actions.
We characterize the Nash lower equilibrium payoffs in undiscounted two-player repeated games by the one-shot game terms. Two sets, C 1 and Cz, of pairs of strategies are defined. C 1 is the set of all the pairs (p 1, P2), where p/is a mixed strategy of player ] (] = 1,2), which have the following property: Among all those strategies p which satisfy both that p induces the same distribution on the signals of player 2 as p I does, and that p does not decrease the possibility to distinguish between actions of player 2,p 1 is the best response against P2 " C2 is defined in a similar way. By playing (p 1, P2) E C1 many times repeatedly, player 2 can detect a deviation of player 1.
The set of the lower equilibrium payoffs is proved to be the payoffs which are both individually rational and included in the intersection of the convex hulls of the payoffs sets associated with C1 and with C2. (f l, f2)), f2 (/2 (f l, fl))) and the signal l i (fl (11 (f i, f2)), f2 (12 (f l, fl))), and so forth. A mixed strategy of player i is a probability measure/l i on F i. Notation 2.4." The set of all the mixed strategies of player i is denoted by A(Fi), i=1,2.
For each pair of pure strategies f; (fl,f2) E F1 x F2 there is a correspondent string of signals n n ~ (SlOe), s2(f))n= 1 E (L 1 X Z2) IN The correspondence is defined as follows: s~ is the element ofL ~ l n S1 S 2 n--1 n 1 sn(f) = i(fl(l(f), l(f), .,
.. S 1 (f)),f2(s2(f),g2(f),...,s~--l(f)))
There is also a correspondent string of payoffs:
/'1 n oo (X l(f) ,x2(f))n: 1 E (X 1 •
IN.
This correspondence is defined as follows:
1
xi (f) = hi(f ] ,fl ) xn(f)=hi~l(Sll(f), n-I n 1 n .... sl (f)),f~ (s2(f) .... , s2-1(f)))"
Let bt = (/~1,/~2) E A(Fx) x A(F2). By the correspondences introduced above, two measures are induced:/~x on 0(1 x X2) ~ , and/1L on (L 1 x L2) ~ .
Definition 2.5: A behavior strategy of player i, i = 1,2,in G* is a sequence f/= (f~ ,f/z, ...) of functions ff:L n-x-~A(zi), n=l,2,... Remark 2. 6.' A repeated game with non-observable actions is a game with perfect recall, and thus, by Kuhn's theorem ([A1 ] , [K] ), we are allowed to concentrate in behavior strategies whenever it is convenient.
Definition 2. 7." Let/2 = ~l,/22) e A(F1) x A(F2) and n E N, Hn(/21,/22)=Expu( 1-~ x~(f)), i=1,2. \nk=l n Hi (/21,/22) is the expectation of the average-payoff of player i at the n first stages of the repeated game, when/21 is the strategy played by player 1, and/22 is that played by player 2. Notation 2.11: If Z is a set and s E ~;, then 5s will denote the Dirac-measure on s, and will be the measure corresponding to s in the set of the probability measures over Z : Zx(Z). Sometimes we will refer to 6 s as s.
Remark 2.12: The functions h = (hi, h2) and l = (/1,12) can be extended to A(EI) x A(E2) in a natural way, such that h i and l i will be ranged to R and to A(Li) respectively (/= 1,2).
Notation 2.13
Max hi (p, q) .
qEA(~2) pEA(:E 1) (2) rl E A(~I) is a strategy which satisfies d 1 = Min hi (7.1, q)- 
3, The Main Theorem
The characterization of the set of lower equilibrium payoffs is done mainly by a partial order defined on A(Zi). We will give the following definitions for strategies of player 1. One can apply similar definitions for player 2.
Definition 3.1
(1) Let s, s' E ~1-s is equivalent to s' (s ~ s') if for every t E E2 12 (s, t) = 12(s', t) . 
i.e., C i is the set of pairs of the one-shot game mixed strategies, in which player i cannot profit by any deviation without being discovered by player 34, or without decreasing his potential of getting information. Intuitively, if (p, q) E C 1 is played repeatedly many times, then player 1 can profit only by a detectable deviation.
Definition 3. 4
Here the element of decreasing the potential to get information is dropped. D1 and D2 will play a role whenever at least one of the players has a trivial information function, namely, whenever one player cannot get any information about his opponent's actions. This player, on one hand, cannot lose the possibility of getting information because he has no such possibility, and in the other hand he cannot recognize that his opponent had decreased his possibility of getting information.
Definition 3.5
(1) Player 1 has trivial information if for any s E Z 1 and t, t' E Ez, ll(S , t) = ll(S, t'), and a similar definition for player 2.
(2) A game G* is a game with trivial information if at least one player has a trivial information, and otherwise it is a game with non-trivial information.
Main Theorem: In a two-players repeated game with non-observable actions the following hold:
(i) If the game is a game with non-trivial information, then
(ii) If the game is a game with trivial information, then
where, for all EC,
Example 3. 6: Standard information. A game with standard information is a game where li(s , t) = (s, t) for all (s, t) @ E1 X Zz. In such a game, Ci=Di=A(E1)xA(Z2), i= 1,2, and therefore LEP = h(A(E l) x A(E2)) AIR. This, in fact, is a part of the content of the folk theorem. 
payoffs slgnals
In this game a player gets a signal c (for cooperation) only when both players act the cooperative actions. Here T+ B and L "~ R, thus LEP is again all the individually rational and feasible payoffs.
Example 3.8: Trivial information for both players. Let li(Sl, s2) = si, i = 1,2. Here, = ((P l, P2) IPi is the best response against P3-i }.
Di
Note that D1 (~ D2 is the set of all Nash equilibria in the one-shot game. In this example we have .payoffs signals In examples 3.7, 3.9 and 3.10, h(C1 n c2) = h(C1) n h(C2). However, in the following example the situation is different: 
Lemma 3.13." Let L be a straight line in ~2 s.t. conv h(Cl) C L + (the open half of the plan). Then there is an a > 0 such that for any h(pl,p2)EL-= (L+) c, there is
hl(p', q)> hi(p, q)+ e for a certain e > 0, then one can findPn >" Pn so that hl(pn , qn) > h 1 (Pn, qn) + c~/2 for any sufficiently large n, which contradicts the assumption. 
atch(pk,qk) EL~
where Na k=l and a k1>0, k=l,...,l k=l 1
Lemma 3.15
asSe~(s ), where 8r >" fis.
asSr , where 8r >" 8s.
Proof." We will prove (i).
Let p">" p be the strategy which achieves Max {hl(/9, q)l/3 >'p}. (p, q)>hl(p', q) . The partial order >-is transitive, so # >" p and we have got h 1 (P, q) > h 1 (P', q)/> h a (P", q), in contradiction to the choice of p".
Lemma 3.16: Let 0 < e < 1 and v, r', r E k(s so that r >-r'. Then Proof." Clear. Proof." We will prove (1) and by a similar argument one can prove (2). If the conditions of (1) hold but there is one action a E E 1 s.t. a a > 0 and (~a, q) ~ Cl, then there is a strategy r E A(~I) s.t. r >-a and h l(r, q) > h l (Sa, q) . Define p' = ~ %~b + aar. P' ;~ P by the preceding lemma. Furthermore, br
This is in contradiction with (p, q) E C 1 .
Q.E.D.
Proof of the Main Theorem
The proof is divided into four steps; the first three steps deal with the non-trivial information.
Step 1: LEP C_ IR.
Step 2: LEP C_ cony h(C1) (~ conv h(C2) (3 IR.
Step 3: cony h(C1 ) N conv h(C2) C~ IR C_ LEP.
The fourth step deals with the trivial information:
Step 4:
At steps 1 and 2 we will concentrate only in behavior-strategy. (Recall Definition 2.5 and Remark 2.6.)
Step 1: LEP CIR.
Let (fl, f2) be a pair of behavior-strategies. If H~(f 1 , f2) < d l, then by deviating to the behavior-strategy gl = (gl,g21 .... ) where, for each n, g~ is defined to be rl,
(1 X l/ .l player 1 can increase his expected payoff, i.e., liminf Exp(g 1:2) k 1
We have got that (fl, f2)is not a lower-equilibrium strategy.
Step 2:
Assume that H*(fl,f2)EIR \ (convh(C1)A conv h(C2) 
(Recall the notation of L~-before Lemma 3.14.) In order to define the behavior-strategy fl by which player 1 can increase his expected payoff, we first have to prove a few lemmata.
Definition 4.1: Let V, U be finite sets, and P a probability measure on V x U. If there are non-negative constants {Xv)v~v, (Yu }u~Cr, and a {0, 
Lemma 4.2: Let A, B and B be finite sets, p is a ({x a }a~A, (Yb }b ~B, r pendent probability on A x B, and o is a ({Xa }a~A, (Zb)~, ~)-semi-independent probability on A x/~. Also let g:B~A u and ~:AxB~AxB.
Suppose that the following three conditions hold: 3
Then, there is a function $ :/~ -+ A u s.t.
gu(gla) =Eo(Rla) for every a EA.
Pl(a) b~B (Pab " Xa " Yb " g(b ) ~(a)
u~(a)
= ~ Xa bE [3 ~ ~ab "7"[9" g(t) )
Lemma 4.3: Let (el, e2) be a pair of behavior strategies e i = (e I , e 2 .... ), i = 1,2, and n E N. If gn is the probability induced by ((e~), (e~))~= 1 on L 7 x L~, then #n is semi-independent.
Proof.-Through induction on n. Furthermore, since a player knows his actions, the same u is good for every b' EL2. I.e. for every b' EL2, there is v' E 2; 2 s.t.
prob(e I ,e2)(a, b') = el(u ) " el(v')" q $1 (a, b') and the same v is good for all a' E L 1. That concludes the proof of n = 1.
By assuming that prob0q ,Y2)(') reduced to (L1 x L2) n is ({Xa}aEL7 , (Yb }bEL~, Cn)-semi-independent, we will prove that prob(y 1,f2)(') reduced to (L1 x L2) n+l is semi-independent. Let there be a' EL7 +1 and b' E L~ +1. Denote the first n coordinates of a' by a and its last coordinate by a, and the first n coordinates of b' by b, and its last one by/3.
prob(e I ,e2)(a' , b ') = x a " Yb " ~)n ( (1, "b )" eT (a) (u ) 9 e~(b ) (v) " ~bl(a ,/3 4~1(a, 3) . This concludes the proof of the inductive step.
fl will be defined in the following way. To begin with, a sequence of behavior strategies of player l:gl, g2, .--, will be defined. This sequence will satisfy the following properties:
In words, gn + 1 coincides with gn on the first n functions. Hf (g,,f2 ).
Q.E.D.
Define now the sequence {gn)n=l by induction, go =fl. Assume that ga, ...,gn-1 were defined to be behavior-strategies of player 1 which satisfy (P1). Namely, gi+l coincides with gi on the first i functions, 1 ~< i ~< n -1. Assume, furthermore, that 
E(gi,f2)(xix , xi2 ) E cony h(C 1 ).
(4.2)
In words, in player 2's point of view, player 1 plays the same strategy, no matter if he follows the strategy fl or the strategy gi. gn will be defined as follows: 
(g~(a),kn(a))EC1
and gin-gn_ 1 for i<~n-I.
In order to define gn k for k > n in such a way that it will satisfy (4.1) for i = n, we have to use Lemma 4.2.
Denote L~ = A, L7 = B = B. g = gn-1 9
/2 = prob(gin_ 1,f~)n 1('),
i.e.,/2 is the probability induced by i i n (gn-x,f~)i=l onA x B. o = prob(gi n ,f~)n= 1('). (u, ll(S, t) ), and by (v, 12(s, t) ) respectively 9
Define for every s E El, t E E2 and (u, 7)) EL~ -1 x L~ -1 ~((7), 12(s, t)), (u, ll (s, t))) = ((v, 12((~(s), t)), (u, ll ((~(s), t))).
On all the remaining points ofA x B, r can be defined arbitrarily, q~(s) >-s, in particular q~(s) ~ s; therefore, /2(r t) = 12(s, t) and (7), 12(r t)) = (v, 12(s, t)).
So, ff satisfies (1) of Lemma 4.2. In order to prove that ff satisfies (3), assume that
~z((V, 12(s, t)), (u, ll(S, t)))= ~z((7)', 12(s', t')), (u', ll(S' , t'))); then, u = u' and ll((~(s), t)) = ll(~s' ), t'). Because player 1 knows his actions ~b(s) = q~(s') and because ~b(s) ~ s and ~(s') >-s', we get l I (s, t) = l I (s, t') and l i (s', t) = l 1 (s', t'). Furthermore r and (~(s')~ s'. Thus, s ~ s', in particular 12(s, t)= 12(s', t) and 12(s', t')=12(s, t'). If t~((v, 12(s, t)), (u, (la(s, t)))>0 and t1(7)', 12(s'. t')), (u', ll(S', t'))) >0, then gn--](u)(s), gn-ln-l(u')(S'), f~-l(7))(t) and f~-l(7)')(t') are all positive numbers. We have got that ((7)', 12(s', t')), (u, ll(s, t))) = ((7), lz(s, t')), (u, la(s, t'))) and ((7), 12($, t)), (U, ll (S' , t'))) = ((7), 12(S', t)), (12, ll (S' , t)))
are in supp ~). The other conclusion required in (3) follows immediatedly from the definition of ~ on the points of this form.
The proof that ~ satisfies (2) is derived from the definition ofg n . Apply, now, Lemma 4.2 to get g. Define gn + 1 to be g. We have got 
E(g i .:i)n(~n +l
i.e., the expected payoff for both players in the n + 1 stage is the same, whether g~n_+ ~ or gn n + 1 is played by player 1. By applying Lemma 4.2 repeatedly, we will define gn l for all l > n + 1, and get the strategy gn.
(4.1) for i = n is given by the following: if n ~< m and w E L~-I, then by the definition of (g~)~n= 1 and by adding (4.1) for i < n, we get:
We have got gl ..... gn which satisfy (4.1) and (4.2) for 1 ~< i ~< n. Continue inductively this way in order to get the sequence gl,g2, ----It remains to prove that this sequence has (P1) and (P2). (P1) Let n CM. Because of (4.1), E(gn-l,f2) (xT' x~) = E(:1,:2)(xT, x~) E L~ (4.6) By Lemma 3.14 there is a ~i > 0 such that prob(gn_ l,.r2) (a @LT-llh(gn_l(a) 
, kn(a)) EL-} > 6
(4.7)
(recall (4.4)).
By Lemma 3.13 and by (4.5), there is ~ > 0 such that" n then h n
hl(gn(a),kn(a)) > l(gn-l(a),kn(a)) + ~.
( 4.8) (4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) give that
Because the sequence gl ,g2, ..-has (P1), by (4.9) and according to Lemma 4.6, ifn is big enough, then
H~(gn,fz) >H~(fl
This means that the sequence gl,g2 .... has also (P2), and the proof of this step is finished.
Step 3: conv h(C1) (~ conv h(C2) N IR C LEP. We will show that for every (•1, Or2)E h(conv C1) O h(conv C2) C) IR, there is a lower equilibrium strategy f = (fl, f2) s.
t. H*(f) = (a 1, az).
Let (a I , a2) @ h(conv C 1) C~ h(conv C2). By the Caratheodory Theorem, for each i E {1,2} there are 3 pairs of mixed strategies { (Pi, l, qi, l) }3=l C C i and three positive constants 7~, l = 1, 2, 3, with total sum 1 so that In order to define fwe need the following notation:
Notation 4. 7: Let e > 0 and x = (Xl, ..., Xn) E A n , the simplex of dimension n -1.
x e is the pointin ((Yl .... ,yn)EA lyi>~e, 1 <~i<~n}, which achieves the minimum distance from x with respect to the maximum norm.
For every x E A n and e > 0
[Ix-xr ~<(n-1)e.
Divide N into an infinite number of sets Ml, M2, B1, B2, B3, B4, ... as follows:
(1) B1 = (1}
(2) IfB2k has been defined, then let b2k = Max Bzx In the sequel, Bl, B2 .... will be called blocks. All the blocks with odd indices will be devoted to player 1 and all the others to player 2, in the sense that in blocks with odd indices, player 2 (by playing a modification of strategies in Cx) checks player 1 while in the remaining blocks player 1 (by playing a modification of strategies in C2) checks player 2. The payoffs at stages of M 1 tO M 2 will have no influence on the payoff's average because of the zero density.
In addition to the information player i gets during the play in block Bk, he also gets information about the block B k during the stages ofM i. By these data player i will be able to check if his opponent has deviated in block B k or not. The additional information received in Mi is needed because the information received in "real-time" is not sufficient to detect all possible deviations. The information collected in "real-time"
is available for a discovery of deviations to strategies which are non-equivalent to the strategy that should have been played. The information collected not in "real-time", namely in M1 or in 3/2, is required for a discovery of deviations to strategies which are not greater (in the sense of ~) than the strategy that should have been played.
How player i can get information about what was going on at stage t long after stage t has passed? Both players have non-trivial information, therefore player 1 has three actions 7)1, Sl, s2 E ~1 and player 2 has three actions v2, tl, t2 E ~2 such that ll (Vl, tl)&ll(Vl, t2) and 12(s1,v2)&12(s2,v2) . To each stage t in a block with an even index we will correlate [L 2 [ -1 stages in M2, say the stages of the set R2(t), and for each stage t in a block with an odd index we will correlate [ L 1 [ -1 stages in M1, say the stages of R 1 (t). Now, at the ]-th stage of R2(t) player 2 has to answer the question ~t(yi) i.e. to act tl for "Yes" and t2 for "No", and player 1 has to play Vl in order to get the answer. If player 1 gets the signal ll (vl, tx) , he understands that the answer to question ~t(yi) is "Yes" and he understands "No" otherwise (see (4.11)). The procedure is similar to stages in M 1 with exchanged roles.
Player 2 has to answer honestly because in the stages of even index blocks he plays pure strategies, and therefore player 1 (knowing his own actions) knows what signals player 2 should have received. Hence, he knows on which action player 2 has to report "Yes" and on which "No".
The strategy f will be defined as follows: Divide the block B k into three parts B~, B]~ and B 3, in such a way that for any segment S in Bk of length k and for any 1~<l~<3:
(4.12)
_ Ilk (see If t EB~c and k is odd, then player 1 has to play Pl,I and player 2 has to play ql,l Notation 4.7), unless player 2 has come to the conclusion that player 1 had deviated some time before B k had started. In this case player 2 will play Oz, by which the punishment is executed, forever.
Alternatively. if t E B k and k is even then player 1 has to playp~(~and player 2 has to play q2,1 unless player 1 comes to the conclusion that player 2 had deviated sometime in the past, before B k. In this case player 1 will punish his opponent forever by playing ol.
How does a player decide whether or not his opponent has deviated? In blocks with odd indices, player 1 plays only pure strategies, therefore when player 2 is acting some a E E2, he is expected to get some signal with probability 1. If he does not get it, he knows that player 1 has deviated. Furthermore, he knows what signal (in L1) player 1 should have got and thus on what signal player 1 should have reported (in the corresponding stages of M2). If the signal reported does not fit the expected one, then player 2 comes to the conclusion that player 1 had deviated.
Player 1 checks player 2 in a similar way.
Lemma 4.9: H*(f) = (al, a2)
Proof." Let t E IN. Denote by v~ the expected payoff of player i at stage t, i.e., v t = E(xt), 1 = 1,2. Player 2 checks player 1 in blocks with odd indices. In addition, in these blocks, player 1 plays only pure strategies. Therefore, the probability that player 2 will punish player 1 because he found a deviation in block B k (although, actually, player 1 did not deviate at all) is zero. Similarly, the probability that player 2 is being punished although he did not deviate is zero. Let n = Max (IN1[, 1~21 By Remark 4.8(1 ),
(4.14)
The term W/k appears because #Bk/k,~<k #B k' < 1/k, and kW/bk appears because #((M 1 f3M2) Cl (1 ..... bk} ) ~< k. The right hand term of (4.14) tends to zero. Since B1 o2 o3 k, ,~k, '-'k are distributed homogeneously in B k (in the sense of (4.12)), the average of the expected payoffs at a stage in the middle of B k is not far from (~1, ~2). In a precise way, let TEB k. By (4.12), (4.13a) and (4.13b),
The first term of the right hand of (4.15)appears because the evaluation of the expected average is done on segments of length k and there are at most k -1 stages that are not contained in such a segment. 
2)II
By (4.14) and (4.15), this is less or equal to
This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
In order to prove that f is a lower equilibrium strategy we need the following probabilistic proposition. According to Proposition 4.10, and by the preceding claim, it is enough to prove that t C for every n and n < n , An C_ An, for some sequence (/3 n } which satisfies ~ n~n < oo. 0-(/n lO+~n '10) C, Since l n < l n,, we can define /3 n = 2el n 1o and get ~ ~n "n < ~ ~n In < ~'. Fix an n=l n=l n, and assume that A c is given from this moment on. The event ACn ' (n <n') is included in the union of two events. The first one is that player 1 did not discern any deviation in block Bin and the second is that player 1 did discern a deviation in block Bln and from that moment on he takes measures in order to punish player 2 (this he does also in block Bin,), but after all this happened, A~, did, all the same, occur.
For evaluating the probabilities of these events we need I.emma 5. by acting r 0 he cannot distinguish between s 1 and s2. The probability to guess correctly (without any mistake) in which stages s, was carried out by player 1 and in which stages s2 was carried out is less than 2 -is~ (because #Bi/2l 2 >/so whenever l = l n is big enough).
To recapitulate, the probability of the first event (i.e. that player 1, given that A~ had occurred, did not discern a deviation) is less than 2 lsO
c~1-10 lZ / #B[ + 16 / #B] + 216/#B{ + -<~
for some constant c 1, whenever l = l n is big enough.
We come now to the evaluation of the probability of the second event (i.e., that player 1 played so as to punish player 2, but it so happened that the average payoff of player 2 at block Bin, is greater than a2 + 7/2). Denote l = l n, and define Yt(s) and Rt(r ) for all s E ~1 and r E 2;2 as above. and therefore with probability of at least 1 -c t n,
(1/#BI) ~ xt2 <-d2 + iZl [" [2; 21" W/l<ot2 +r~/2 tEB I whenever l = ln" is big enough (so that 1I; 1 ] ' 12;21" W/l < 7//2).
Summary: Let ~ = Max (c', c") .
We obtain that prob (A n. [A c)/> 1 -~(ln !0 + In ,1~
as desired. The proof of Lemma 4.11 is finished. Q.E.D.
Step 4: Trivial information.
Step 1 does not depend on the information, therefore LEP C IR. Let player 1 be the player with trivial information. By the definitions, C 1 =D 1 .
The proof of step 2 provides that LEP C_ cony h(D1). LEP C_ convh(D2), because otherwise let f= (fl,f2) be a lower equilibrium strategy with H*(f)q~ conv h(Dz).
Since the information of player 1 is trivial the actions of player 1 do not depend on the previous actions of player 2. Therefore a deviation gz of player 2 can be defined as follows: for every m E IN and w EL~ n-1 let gr~(w) be the strategy q(w) which is the I 2 best response against N probfl (u)f 1 (U). The proof that g2 = (g2,g2,---) is a uEL r~ --1 "good" deviation is similar to the proof appearing at Step 2.
The opposite direction of the inclusion, namely that cony h(D 1) r3 cony h(D2) C3
IR _C LEP is proved in a way similar to that in Step 3, except for the element of asking questions during the game, which is dropped here.
5 Concluding Remarks 5.1 We required in Definition 2.1.2(i) that a player will be informed about his own actions. By Dalkey's Theorem [D] , any mixed (or behavior) strategies in which a player can rely on his own previous actions has an equivalent mixed strategy in which a player does not rely on his actions. Therefore, we could drop that requirement and get the same results.
5.2 We could define the notion of upper equilibrium by exchanging liminf with limsup (in Definition 2.9), or instead define an equilibrium by any Banach limit. The question of characterization the set of all the payoffs associated with upper (Banach) equilibria in the general case is still open. In [L2] , which relies on this paper, a characterization of these sets in the case of observable payoffs is given. Another case in which we have a full characterization is the case of semi-standard information in which a player is informed about the class that includes his opponent's action (see [L1 ] ).
